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Foreign Assessment Center

Western Europe Review

7 February 1979

State Department review completed

Secret

RP WER 79-006 7 February 1979

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T009 12A001700010006-5

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TO THE HOLDERS OF Western Europe Review:

Please change the second paragraph, page 10, to read:

"The continued ascendancy in the public opinion polls of Socialist leader Michel Rocard is a bright spot among other indications that the Socialist Party, despite advances last March and some recent parliamentary by-elections, may not have an easy time recapturing, in a national contest, the moderate voters it lost in the last weeks before the March election."

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The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics	25X1
The Turkish military has often played a major and	
at times a decisive role in shaping Turkish politics	
The extent of its intervention has depended largely on the amount of perceived divergence between the goals of	
the military and those of the political establishment	
and on now well the military's corporate interests were	
being met. Political and economic crises threatening	
Ataturk's ideal of a strong and unified stateand more parochial and material concerns as wellhave periodically	
impelled the military to expand its political role; more	
tranquil and prosperous periods have prompted it to de-	
emphasize that role.	
The current internal security and economic crisis	
unat has left more than 800 people dead and the economy	
nearly Dankrupt has enhanced the prospect that the mili-	
tary again will feel compelled to play a more obtrusive role. The politicians' reluctant resort to martial law	
to quell the spiraling political violence, and the recent	
arring of financial and moral problems within the services	
brought on by the economic troubles, may be precursors of such a development.	25X1
or such a development.	23/1
To be sure, the military was disillusioned by its	
earlier attempts to run the country, and politicians	
have grown more inclined to resist its involvement. And maintaining the country's Western credentials, which is	
important to the military, places a premium on staying	
In the Darracks. Nevertheless, such considerations are	
apt to become secondary if progress is not made toward	
resolving the growing malaise in the Turkish polity and economy.	
The Legacy of Ataturk	
The military's view of its role derives in part	
from two precepts of Ataturk; and, as is so often the	
case, these precepts are contradictory: first that	
the military should stay out of politics; and second,	

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that the military has a special relationship to the state and is the guardian of its ideals. Though Ataturk considered the military to be the guarantor of his regime, he carefully separated it from day-to-day governing. His aim was to protect his own position from his detractors in the officer corps, but he also acted out of conviction that a politicized military could neither be strong nor govern well. A political party, Ataturk believed, could do a better job of governing and mobilizing the masses to support his modernization goals.

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The officers acquiesced not only because of Ataturk's charisma, but also because their own institutional prerogatives and status remained unchallenged, and the compartmentation between military and civilians was never total. They trusted Ataturk, their former Commander-in-Chief, to honor military values and interests. The military remained a state within a state, responsible only to the President and enjoying a privileged status with respect to national resources and budgets. Officers could and did move easily into political and administrative roles, so much so that Turkey could be said to have been governed by a "civilianized" military.

Over time, however, Ataturk's reforms had a profound--and ironic--influence on the relationship between military and political spheres. Modernization of the society and economic development, together with external stimuli from Turkey's Western allies, produced political pluralism and a rival elite of professionals and businessmen who challenged the tutelary role and the Ataturkist principles of the ruling military bureaucrats. As often as not, the military has reacted to this new challenge by emphasizing the Ataturkist precept that makes it the guardian of Ataturkism, rather than the precept of noninvolvement in politics. But because Ataturkism is a diffuse ideology, the military has often used it to mask more self-interested motives.

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Praetorian Impulses

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Conspiratorial activity and interventionism have frequently characterized the Turkish military in the 40 years since Ataturk's death. The outstanding example

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was the 1960 coup, which overthrew the conservative and increasingly authoritarian Menderes government. This was followed by the imposition of a new, more liberal constitution and several years of behind-the-scenes political involvement by the military. In 1971 a "coup by memorandum" forced the resignation of the conservative Demirel government after it had failed to control growing political violence. This was followed by another period of thinly veiled military influence over politics.

There have also been several unsuccessful coup attempts and offers by various military factions to intervene in behalf of particular parties. Two coup attempts were nipped in the bud in the early 1960s, and some officers offered to block the transfer of power in the late 1940s when Turkish democracy was first launched. There was even a plot against Ataturk's life during the early part of his tenure.

Causes of Interventionism

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A traditional feature of the ethos of the officer corps is that the military has a special relationship to and a responsibility for the state. This proprietary view was often expressed by Ataturk: "Our Republic respects only the will of the people, and the guidance of the military"; "When speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country. . . ."

The social origins of the Turkish military have tended to reinforce its proprietary attitude toward the state. They have also predisposed the military to have a national as opposed to a parochial outlook, thus enhancing the military's receptivity to Ataturk's reformist principles. A 1971 survey of 239 officers found that nearly half had fathers who were either officers or civil servants. Over half the members of the Committee of National Unity responsible for the 1960 coup were the children of officers or officials. Almost all of the other officers in these surveys came from middle and lower middle class backgrounds; only 14 percent of the 1971 sample and 8 percent of the 1960 group were of peasant stock, the class most resistant to Ataturk's

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reforms. Only 5 percent of the 1971 respondents and none of the 1960 revolutionaries came from working class backgrounds, which helps explain why the far left in general and Communism in particular have never been a potent force within the officer corps, even though the officers were receptive to Ataturk's brand of classless reformism.

Military training in Turkey tends to foster asceticism and a concern for order and control, as well as a commitment to the nation as a whole. Concomitantly, there is disdain for the political world, which is often equated with materialism, license, and particularism.

Status and Role Challenged

Another important factor behind the military's political interventionism has been the decline of the officer corps in relation to other elites and its efforts to preserve or restore its former status. The 1960 coup, for example, was aimed against the ruling Democrats and their business, professional, and rural supporters who were not wholly committed to Ataturkist principles, such as secularism and etatism, and who feared and sought to limit the prerogatives of the military. Reductions in defense spending during the Democrats' 10 years in office resulted in the failure of officers' salaries to keep up with inflation and forced many officers to resign or moonlight.

Of equal importance, the military profession was scorned by members of the new elite, and retired military officers were no longer encouraged to enter politics, the bureaucracy, or private industry. The ratio of former officers in the Grand National Assembly, for example, was one-sixth in 1920, one-eighth in 1943, and one-twentieth after the Democrat landslide of 1950. In a 1959 survey of Lycee students, 56 percent stated they felt the greatest respect for the free professions such as law and medicine while only 13 percent mentioned the military.

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Officers Rally

The 1960 coup restored much of the military's corporate prerogatives if not all of its former status; it again became an autonomous institution accountable only to the Prime Minister. The newly formed National Security Council gave the military a legal voice in the making of general government policy. The first two presidents after the coup were former military men handpicked by the military. Salaries and pensions rose dramatically, and retired officers were again courted by the political parties and recruited into the upper levels of the bureaucracy and the business world. Moreover, the creation of the Army Mutual Assistance Association, which invested funds deducted from the officers' pay, brought the military directly into business; it soon became one of the largest conglomerates in the coun-The 1971 intervention was aimed in part at preserving its benefits and status from the newly emergent extremist groups, mainly on the left, which threatened the system as well as the government.

New Self-Doubts About Tutelary Role

While the military has recouped many of its corporate interests and prerogatives, it has become increasingly weary of its tutelary mission, in part because the Ataturkist ideals are no longer as sacrosanct. Praetorianism has created divisions within the military over the meaning of Ataturkism. It has damaged the military's professionalism and has led to factional division, purges, and counterpurges (some 5,000 to 7,000 officers were cashiered in 1960 and several hundred in 1971). And it has proved embarrassing in relations with NATO.

The public and politicians have also become less inclined to accept a tutelary military. The 40-percent vote against the military-inspired 1961 Constitution and the electorate's consistent support of parties representing the personalities and programs of the ousted Democrats were tantamount to a rejection of the revolution and its instigators. Emboldened by the electorate's skepticism, politicians of all persuasions have become more assertive, most dramatically in 1973, when the politicians defied the military and rejected its candidate for president in favor of the present incumbent, Fahri Koruturk.

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A rift has also developed between the military and its erstwhile Ataturkist partner, the Republican Peoples Party. Under Prime Minister Ecevit's left-of-center policies, the party has become too reformist for some of the more conservative senior officers. These officers find they get along better with the more conservative Justice Party. It was the left wing of Ecevit's party that suffered most in the repressive martial law period following the 1971 coup, not the supporters of the Demirel government which was the ostensible target of the coup. Some quarters of the party and the military still distrust each other.

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Political Preferences

The political preferences of the officer corps are no longer as monolithic as they once were. Despite the frictions of recent years, support for the Republicans remains strong at all levels, but especially among junior and field grade officers. The Republican's appeal arises from its historic status as the party of Ataturk, its earlier responsiveness to the military's interests, and the accordance of its program with Ataturkist principles. The Justice Party, as the direct descendant of the Democrats, was once despised by the officer corps, but Demirel's lipservice to Ataturkism and his generosity and cultivation of the military during his 10 years in office have made some inroads with the military.

Among the smaller parties, the neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party of Alpaslan Turkes, a prime mover behind the 1960 coup and an overt advocate of another military intervention, probably has the support of a limited number of officers. The Islamic fundamentalism of the National Salvation Party is anathema to the secularist military as is the internationalism of the extreme leftist parties, all of which were proscribed for a period after the 1971 coup.

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Toward Repoliticization?

Present conditions in Turkey are similar in many ways to earlier crises that brought on military intervention. Political violence and social unrest are pervasive. The economy is in shambles, with an inflation rate of at least 50 percent, unemployment of 20 percent;

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and foreign exchange is in short supply. As in earlier periods preceding military intervention, moreover, political leaders have tacitly admitted their failure to cope with the crisis by declaring martial law. This has opened the way for a greater political role for the military while simultaneously increasing the prospects for friction between the military and civilian establishments.

Ecevit's talk about implementing a "New Defense Concept" calling for a leaner military and tighter defense budgets has aroused the corporate concerns of the military. The proposed defense allocation for 1970--15.3 percent of the general budget -- is the lowest in recent years, although the lifting of the US arms embargo will offset some of the reductions. In an apparent effort to nudge the government to increase the amount allocated for defense and also to mollify the officer corps, General Staff Chief Evren recently called the public's attention to military grievances. Evren focused on insufficient budgetary support, inadequate foreign exchange, and increasing officer resignations because of poor pay, low morale, and poor housing facilities -- all reminiscent of officer complaints prior to the 1960 coup.

Or Toward Noninvolvement?

Until recently, when the bite of the latest economic downturn was felt, the military seemed to be doing well in a corporate sense. The tensions with Greece since 1974 resulted in higher defense spending and arms purchases, and served to focus the military's attention on its primary mission of defending the country. Officer salaries and pensions remained well above the rate

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of inflation, increasing sevenfold between 1967-77 while prices increased only fourfold. The perceived resistance of the politicians and the electorate to another military intervention has acted as another deterrent to political involvement, as has the desire not to hurt the chances for Western economic and military aid and diplomatic support against the Greeks.

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Outlook

There are, nevertheless, circumstances under which the factors making for another intervention could prevail. Failure by the government to turn the economy around, the persistence, despite martial law, of political violence, and a concerted effort by Ecevit to reduce the size of the defense establishment all could provoke an expanded political role by the military. The fall of the government, too, might tempt the military to try to play a role in selecting a successor.

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Should the military decide to intervene, it would probably prefer in the first instance to do so from behind the scenes, either by pressing Ecevit to resign or by helping to choose a successor if he falls. A more direct intervention, such as a "coup by memorandum" as in 1971, would probably come as a result of resistance from political leaders, in response to pressure from within the military, or in order to preempt more radically inclined junior officers. The least likely form would be a direct military takeover. This would probably be mounted by junior and field grade officers; it would very likely be undertaken only after a complete breakdown in law and order.

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ficer corps, intervention would probably not lead to revolutionary changes in Turkish society or Turkish foreign policy, no matter which group came to power. And the more the senior officers are involved, the greater the chance that the intervention would be brief and modest in its goals.

Given the present political orientation of the of-

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A return to praetorian rule might ameliorate but would not solve Turkey's problems, and it would bring into question the professionalism of the officer corps.

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Nevertheless, over the longer term, some alternation between democracy and military involvement in the Turkish political process seems a possibility. Successive stages of the modernization process are likely to be disruptive and will stimulate the latent conviction of the military that only it can hold the country together.

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France: Difficult Times for the French Left	25X1
"The French left is a field of ruins where the survivors gleefully vilify each other as the vast majority of men and women of the left look on with stupor."	*
Pierre Viansson-Ponte, <u>Le Monde</u> 20 January.	
Viansson-Ponte is perhaps a bit overwrought, but the quarreling and divisiveness of the French left, which has continued unabated since the left lost the legislative election last March, has rendered it politically ineffective and has begun to discourage even its most determined supporters. The left, in short, has spent the period since the elections consolidating its defeat.	25X1
The continued ascendancy in the public opinion polls of Socialist leader Michel Rocard is an important indication that the Socialist Party, despite advances last March and some recent parliamentary byelections, may not have an easy time recapturing, in a national contest, the moderate voters it lost in the last weeks before the March election.	
The results of five recent byelections, in which the Socialists topped 30 percent and the Communists scored	

The results of five recent byelections, in which the Socialists topped 30 percent and the Communists scored about 15 percent, coupled with polls last fall giving the Socialists 32 percent of the electorate, were a big boost for the Socialists, still suffering from their failure to do as well as expected in March (22.6 percent). At the same time, however, electoral trends in that election, now being fully analyzed, were not as favorable for the Socialists as they had hoped they failed, for example, to pick up as much support as they had expected from the newly enfranchised 18-year-olds. Also, analysis of 40 cantonal byelections over the last two years does not show the strong Socialist spurt ahead of the Communists that appeared in the recent legislative byelections. Because local considerations are paramount in cantonal elections, these are not particularly good indicators, but there is perhaps a warning here for the Socialist leadership.

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The Socialist Party is	nonetheless still	the party
that ranks highest in public	c esteem, although	it dropped
three points in the last mor	nth (53 percent of	the people
now have a good opinion of	it), probably becau	se of the
polemics within the party of	ver the leadership	struggle.
The Communist ranking60 pe	ercent unfavorable	opinions
has been holding steady.]

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The Socialists can probably expect to do well in both the March cantonal elections and the European Parliament election in June because of the special character of these contests. They will not be held back by the Communist connection and should pick up some economic protest vote; moreover the voter can support the Socialists without fearing that a national left government will come to power. A recent poll, in fact, gives the Socialists a whopping 39.7 percent of the vote in the European contest—higher than the party's most optimistic estimates. The Communists got just under 11 percent. The same poll gave the Gaullists 14 percent (against 22.6 percent in March) and the Giscardian UDF 20 percent (against 21.6 percent in March). The results of this poll were so surprising that several EC commissioners managed to stop its publication, although the results have become widely known.

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A good showing by the Socialists this spring should improve the party's morale and help reestablish its credibility, but it will not resolve its fundamental problem. Even if the Communist share of the left vote (20.6 percent last March) declines, it is too large to be ignored, and all factions of the Socialist leadership believe that the party cannot move toward the center without abandoning too many votes on the left to the Communists. Even Michel Rocard--whatever his real beliefs--continually proclaims his fidelity to the goal of union with the Communists, which he says he wants to build up from th grass roots since he believes the present Communist leadership is intransigent. Party leader Mitterrand hopes that successive polls and elections showing Socialists outdistancing Communists will force the Communists to compromise. it was precisely the Socialists' outgunning of the Communists at the ballot box that led the Communists to scuttle the March election, this does not seem a logical aspiration.

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The union of the left can only be made credible as an alternative to the government in power if the Communists change their spots. This appears unlikely at the present time. The Socialists, despite their brave talk of autonomy, can not realistically hope to gain enough votes to come to power alone. Their party is therefore locked into the opposition like "an unemployed giant," in the words of one French journalist.

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Despite the dismal prospects for the left's accession to power or a Socialist presidential victory in 1981, the Socialist presidential nomination is being hotly contested within the party. The leadership struggle, which pits the Mitterrand faction against Rocard and Pierre Mauroy, Mitterrand's second in command, has so riled up the party leadership that it seems to have abandoned any pretension of putting forward an attractive alternative to the current government's policies, or any kind of innovative strategy that might attract votes. Almost half the populace would like to see Michel Rocard play an important role politically; only 36 percent express similar sentiments about Mitterrand. For the first time, Rocard is also favored over Mitterrand among Socialist voters (64 percent against 57 percent). Mitterrand, who still retains an image as a unifier of the left--albeit a bit tattered--makes a better score among Communist voters: 52 percent against 36 percent

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The struggle between Mitterrand and Rocard is mainly a matter of personal ambition, although there are many issues involved, some real and some imagined. These include Mitterrand's autocratic style of rule, the nationalistic, anti-European attitude of many of his faction, and his alleged "archaism" as opposed to Rocard's more pragmatic, gradual approach to economic reform. Mitterrand has probably been pushed more to the left than he would like, both because Rocard has co-opted much of the party's moderate wing and because Mitterrand wants to woo the leftwing CERES faction and attract votes away from the Communists. Both men have claimed at one time or another, however, that they really have no basic philosophical or policy differences. The issues that are at stake tend to be blurred because both Mitterrand and Rocard speak in a sort of code, designed to conceal rather than reveal.



Francois Mitterrand, Michel Rocard, and Pierre Mauroy

The Socialists' CERES faction, which has not yet openly committed itself to either Mitterrand or Mauroy-Rocard, recently estimated that Mauroy-Rocard had the allegiance of 40 percent of the party,* Mitterrand 35 percent, and CERES 25 percent. CERES has a dissenting minority, however, and they can be expected to give their support to Rocard. Since the Mauroy-Rocard faction has publicly rejected any compromise with the CERES majority, primarily because of its anti-European views, CERES is a logical if opportunistic ally for Mitterrand, despite his personal pro-European views. The jockeying for power will probably not be resolved until the Socialist Party congress at Metz in April, which looks like a cliff-hanger. Mitterrand is a skilled political infighter and many among the party rank and file are loyal to him.

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*It did not escape the attention of the French press that shortly after Mauroy threw his support to Rocard he was received by President Giscard, ostensibly to discuss economic problems in the Nord - Pas de Calais region. Giscard and his advisers are known to believe that there can be no accommodation with the Socialists as long as Mitterrand is their leader.

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The Mitterrand-Rocard struggle and the strained relations between the Communists and Socialists are the sort of psychodramas that the French public likes to watch. They have been widely played up by the media, both government-controlled and Socialist-leaning. The end result appears to be a growing realization, even on the left, that the union of the left could not have worked. The Socialists are still prisoners of their own rhetoric, however, and no one in the leadership dares yet openly question the strategy of union with the Communists.

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The Communists

The Communists have returned to their lair to lick their postelectoral wounds, deny that such wounds exist, rail at the Socialists, and generally comport themselves in a manner unlikely to appeal to other than an already convinced electorate, and maybe not even that. At the same time, they have been trying to find some way out of their domestic and international isolation. The party has been echoing an old theme: "union of the people of France," that is, unity around the party on certain specific issues. (The Socialist Party is, of course, excluded.) The party has also been multiplying its international contacts.


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The party's rabid nationalism, anti-German rhetoric, and demagogic defense of the steel industry may pay off among its clientele in the north, and in the south and southwest its campaign against enlargement of the EC may be fruitful. Yet the party stands to lose votes in the coming cantonal and Euro-elections. And there is a definite malaise within the party, despite its blustering about topping the 700,000 membership mark.

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The leadership has been inconsistent and ambivalent about handling the dissent of party intellectuals. The intellectuals have never had much clout in the party—they number perhaps 50,000—but their criticisms, usually published in the non-communist press, were becoming embarrassing. The party recently published a book by Maurice Goldring (L'Accident), which is quite critical of its conduct in the recent electoral campaign. In early December, the politburo had an unprecedented meeting with some 400 selected party intellectuals who have been demanding more liberty and democracy in the party, more

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Georges Marchais

flexible leadership, and more say in analyzing and developing relations with the Socialists. During the meeting, an apparently fairly accurate account of which was later published in L'Humanite, the intellectuals let off steam and the party leadership came under fire. No real debate on party policy took place, however, and Communist leader Georges Marchais afterwards declared himself satisfied that he had the intellectuals behind him. The party has been trying to split dissidents like Jean Elleinstein and Jean Rony, whom the party wants to isolate and keep on the sidelines, from acceptable ones like Goldring, whose criticism touches on tactics rather than fundamental strategy or matters of internal organization.

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It does not look as if the intellectuals can expect much in the way of democratization of internal party life or a switch in strategy at the party congress scheduled for mid-May. The party appears to have decided on a hard line on dissent, a temporary retrenchment behind its traditional worker electorate, and the abandonment for an indefinite period of the union of the left strategy, as well as any hopes of coming to power.

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According to the liberal weekly <u>L'Express</u>, this line was confirmed at a meeting of the party leadership in mid-December; it represents Marchais' siding with the orthodox Roland Leroy, who was critical of the alliance with the Socialists, against politburo member Paul Laurent. We have no evidence to confirm this alignment, but there has in fact been a renewed crackdown on dissent and apathy. The party apparently hopes that by preserving its "hard and pure" (pur et dur) image, even at the risk of losing some members, it will be able to ride out the aftereffects of its March defeat. The aftereffects include apathy among

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the rank and file, who appear willing to stick with the Marchais leadership but seem more resigned than enthusiastic.* This apathy has been shown by a drop in attendance at cell meetings and in the readership and sale of the party's "L'Humanite."
At the same time, the party's fulminations against enlargement of the EC and the dangers to France's sovereignty represented by the European Parliament has won its first kind words from Pravda in a long time. Pravda in mid-January complimented both the Communists and the Gaullists for their votes in Parliament against two bills connected with the EC. Also in mid-January L'Humanite reported that politburo member Maxime Gremetz, charged with foreign relations, had met with Vadim Zagladin, Communist Party watcher for the CPSU, and discussed several questions of interest, including cooperation between the two parties. The French Communists have also been leaning even further forward than they usually do in their support of Soviet foreign policy objectives (Kampuchea, Vietnam, SALT), while generally praising the economic
and social programs of the Warsaw Pact countries.
On the domestic front, <u>L'Humanite</u> on 12 January complimented the Gaullists on their refound unity behind Jacques Chirac and his European policies. Gremetz has also publicly raised the possibility of meeting with Chirac's supportersas in 1954, when Communists and Gaullists defeated the European Defense Community (EDC).
The Communists are obviously feeling isolated not only in French society but also within Western Europe. Their differences of opinion with the Italian Communist Party and the Spanish Communist Party (particularly over EC enlargement) are sharp. The party has become engaged in a flurry of international contacts over the past six months (East Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Mexico, Hungary, USSR, Italy, and Spain), presumably in part to show that it has friends and contacts in the international community.

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*No party leader approaches Marchais' popularity, however. In a January poll, 62 percent of Communist voters said they would like Marchais to head the list for the election to the European Parliament. Rene Andrieu came next with 44 percent.

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The Communists' biggest problem, however, is its sibling enemy—a Socialist Party whose left credentials are in order and which appeals not only to the working class but to a much broader electorate. In the face of that competition the Communists are on the defensive and are likely to take losses in the coming elections: they may be severe in the election to the European Parliament.

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MBFR: The 17th Round Has Begun	25X1
The force reduction talks resumed last week in Vienna with little prospect of a break in the East-West deadlock. The major difficulty arises from differences over the two sides' data on military force levels in Central Europe. Last June, the Soviets and their allies accepted the Western principle of putting a "common ceiling" on NATO and Warsaw Pact manpower, but they submitted data showing the troop strength of the two sides to be nearly equal. NATO estimates that the Pact has over 150,000 more ground force personnel in Central Europe than NATO. Thus, using Eastern figures, both sides would make nearly equal reductions to reach a common ceiling, while Western figures would require a significantly larger reduction by the Pact.	25X1
Western negotiators have attempted to force the East into a more detailed explanation of its data by tabling selective NATO estimates of the size of Eastern military formations, such as divisions. The East has so far refused to discuss the details, citing security concerns, and has sought to impugn NATO's estimates by claiming that they overstate the strength at which Eastern forces are commonly manned.	25X1
During the last round, the Soviets and their allies indicated they would like to move beyond the current pre-occupation with data. They also appeared to be concerned that NATO may be reconsidering its proposal to withdraw some US tactical nuclear weapons in exchange for asymmetrical reductions of Pact manpower and Soviet armored forces—the so-called Option III package. The East has also made clear, however, that any new initiative on its part will be contingent on a Western response to the	
East's proposal of last June.	25X1

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While some NATO members thought the June proposal offered opportunities for movement in the talks, the West has not succeeded in framing a detailed reply. In fact, some of the smaller West European participants -- and to some extent the British--have become impatient and frustrated with the pace of the talks. Although British Foreign Secretary Owen's proposal for a foreign minister's meeting on MBFR received little support, more suggestions aimed at giving the talks impetus will no doubt be heard. Should the talks remain stalled, some the West Europeans may begin to wonder if MBFR is worth the effort and to explore alternative arms control forums. The French proposal for a European disarmament conference--one alternative--would probably have to be modified substantially to garner West European support and to be acceptable to the Soviets.

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A basic reorientation of Alliance arms control policy could not, of course, take place without the acquiescence of the West Germans. Although Chancellor Schmidt has spoken in favor of moving the talks forward, he has remained essentially committed to a strategy of negotiation through strength, which is supported by Foreign Minister Genscher--who is also chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP)--and Defense Minister Apel. Although the Chancellor is under increased pressure from the left wing of his own Social Democratic Party (SDP) to take some sort of disarmament initiative, neither a majority of the SPD nor the FDP would support such a move at this time.

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West Germany: Strong Public Reaction to "Holocaust"	
Television Drama	25X1
Initial reaction to the broadcast in West Germany of the NBC "docudrama" depicting Hitler's program for extermination of the Jews has been unusually strong and politically positive. The exceptional impact of "Holocaust" surprised West German opinion makers and some are still groping to explain why this inexpert, commercial television film becameovernighta milestone in the West German postwar consideration of the horrors of the Third Reich. Record audiences viewed the installments of "Holocaust," transmitted during the week of 22 January, and unprecedented interest has been expressed by letters or calls to the network stations. It was evident from public discussions transmitted after each installment that West German desire for more information about the Third Reich has been greatly stimulated. It seems quite possible that this media event will bolster the political movement to lift West Germany's statute of limitations on murder, thus clearing the way for continued prosecution of any newly identified Hitler era criminals.	25X1
Like the Greek Tragedies?	
The topic of Hitler's "final solution" for the Jews is not taboo in the Bonn republic. Documentaries about the death camps have been shown since the end of the war and the theme appears regularly in postwar literature and drama. A good example is the "Diary of Anne Frank," which attracted special public interest as a book, a play, and finally as a movie. There are currently 12 trials of Nazi era functionaries charged with murder or as accessories to murder in West German courts. In preparation for the "Holocaust" series, a documentary on Third Reich death camps was broadcast during the preceding week* and the government and the West German	
*During this broadcast, an explosion knocked out a regional transmitter for about 30 minutes. An ostensibly neo-Nazi group later claimed credit for this act. Special precautions were taken to assure the transmission of "Holocaust"	25¥1

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media issued publications explaining the US-produced series. The government pamphlet, offered to teachers for classroom use, was printed in 155,000 copies only and was oversubscribed immediately after the first installment.	25X′
Surprise over the reaction to the film reflects in part critical prejudgments of the film's quality. Both attitudes are reflected in an advertisement for the news-weekly Der Spiegel's 17-page coverage of "subject number one in the nation": "An American TV series of debatable workmanship, produced more for commercial than moral reasons, more for entertainment than enlightenment, succeeded in what hundreds of books, dramas, films and TV broadcasts, thousands of documents and all the concentration camp trials in more than three decades failed to do-namely to give the German people such a clear picture of the crimes against the Jews committed in their name that millions were stunned."	25X1
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In retrospect, a respected Frankfurt paper concluded the dramatization of the lives of two families, one of Jewish martyrs and the other a family of one of their Nazi persecutors, managed to reach "areas of the psyche that have remained closed" to the message of documents. The simple drama of "Holocaust" cut through abstractions and personalized the impersonal horror of the "final solution." One of the many experts who participated in the discussion rounds after each installment used the analogy of classical Greek drama, which had the ability to address crimes so dark the normal person could not conceive them on a personal—and therefore understandable—level.	25X1
Reactions	_

Not all the feelings released by the West German showing of "Holocaust" were positive. Some Germans are bitter about the need to relive the past, resentful that US commercial television exploited a German tragedy, and genuinely upset about what the revival of interest in the crimes of the Third Reich could do to the German image abroad. Such voices are not surprising. They are mainly individual reactions, however, in a public discussion where the main journals of opinion, both liberal and conservative, found the broadcasts useful and the overall public reaction encouraging.

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Judging from the tens of thousands of telephoned and written responses to "Holocaust" from those who watched the broadcasts, the great majority--about two-thirds--of West Germans find that this reminder was necessary for an understanding of what happened between 1933 and 1945. Perhaps more importantly, it has led to deep and searching discussions concerning the why of Nazism's oncedominant position in German life. In this sense, the showing of "Holocaust" was not only worthwhile but necessary.

A balanced and illuminating remark on the discussion that followed this broadcasting event was made by an observer in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "One heard in the questions the distress of a people also punished by crimes (Dresden, the eastern expulsions) that here had to face up to their own act."

Questions for the Future

Signs indicate the impact of "Holocaust" in West Germany will not be ephemeral. Sociological studies of reactions to the broadcast are not expected for weeks. Furthermore, the unexpected public involvement has stimulated the intellectuals to more open consideration of themes from modern German history. A central question raised: why did this at least partial catharsis require an American film that many find inadequate to the seriousness of the theme? Commenting on this, one German television writer said that he could not have done the script, in part because no German could have dealt objectively with the theme--especially data concerning non-German involvement in the exterminations--without seeming to plead.

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There is talk of a German-produced treatment of the "final solution" that goes beyond the oft-used documentary format. Difficult themes that could attract more attention as a result of this event are not limited to Hitler's treatment of the Jews. A Bavarian youth group, evincing dissatisfaction with one-sided admissions of guilt, has asked that "Holocaust" be followed by a film series on the expulsions of ethnic Germans from their former homes in Eastern Europe. Also widely noted is that West Germany's regional television is the least powerful of the three networks: this limited the audience somewhat but did not prevent the "Holocaust" broadcast from becoming an overwhelming media and political experience.

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Media politics that lay behind the decision to use the Third Program have not been well explained, but one factor is that the two major networks evidently feared the United States film would offend their larger viewing audiences. There is talk now of repeating "Holocaust" over one of the main channels. One reason for this is that it could then be widely received by East Germans, whose reception of the Third Program is limited to the immediate border areas.	25X1
Political Repercussions	
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt broached this theme in a brief statement before the Bundestag, observing that "Holocaust" ought to be shown in the other part of Germany, since the people there "also have a right to think about our joint German history." The Chancellor's other remarks about the broadcast were cautions but positive; he welcomed the film because "it forces Germans to think critically and morally (about their past)."	25X1
In general, confrontation with Third Reich crimes may be easier and more advantageous for the parties of the Schmidt government. Conservatives seem to inherit the main burden of reconciling the sins of the Hitler era with their pride in German tradition. As the Bundestag lineup on whether to lift the statute of limitations shows, however, the issue is basically nonpartisan and revolves around legal questions as well as the philosophical problem of whether penance is eternal.* Because this issue is now before the Bundestag, the national discussion set off by transmission of "Holocaust" inevitably will influence the outcome of the debate.	25X1
Ten days after the media event, Minister of Justice Hans-Jochen Vogel made known his conclusion that the US television series about the mass murder of the Jews during World War II had produced a shift of public feeling toward lifting the statute of limitations. At this point, Vogel said, it appears that elimination of the statute for murder, which would allow for prosecution of Nazi criminals discovered after the statute of limitations expires at the end of the year, appears probable.] 25X1
*The issue of whether to lift the statute of limitations was ex- plored in "West Germany: Statute of Limitations on Third Reich Murders," Western Europe Review, 23 January 1979.]
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Iceland: Ho-Hum Crisis

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Iceland's center-left coalition government, formed in early September after two months of negotiations, faces another hurdle as it tries to draft an economic reform bill acceptable to the three coalition partners. This measure is the latest in a series of government efforts to come to grips with the country's mounting economic problems, especially its inflation rate of more than 40 percent. Given each party's interest in continuing in the government, a compromise will probably be reached.

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The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Progressives have developed similar detailed economic packages designed to take the first step in a long-term effort to reduce inflation. The third member of the coalition, the People's Alliance (PA), made a more general statement of economic goals which clearly pandered to short-term wage earner interest. Iceland's National Economic Institute estimated that the SDP proposals would lower the inflation rate this year to 25 or 30 percent and the Progressive to 30 percent, while the PA approach would have little impact. Automatic quarterly cost-of-living wage increases take effect on 1 March, and the SDP has declared this the deadline for submitting the economic bill--its own or a negotiated compromise--but some delay is possible.

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The Social Democrats have been especially troubled by the course of economic legislation. They compete with the other parties, but particularly with the PA, for labor support. This means that no party wants to be identified with wage restraining measures. Most of the Social Democrats in Parliament, however, attribute the party's improved showing in the last election to labor's acceptance of the party's campaign axiom that income restraints are necessary to control inflation. Party leader and Foreign Minister Grondal, who is enjoying his Cabinet role, was concerned that the SDP position would lead to a collapse of the government and at first opposed his party's proposals. His parliamentary group prevailed, however.

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Because the Social Democrats have not been in the government since 1971, they are likely to make some concessions in order to continue as a part of a center-left coalition. A poll released in mid-December, showing continued strong support for the party despite its compromises, seemed to encourage party leaders to continue to	
work within the coalition. The SDP parliamentary group could, however, consider a spring election a referendum	
on its program and expect to form a new coalition based	
on a mandate for economic reform.	25X1
The Progressives, who did badly in the last election, enjoy their leadership role in the coalition. Furthermore, they too would prefer to stay with the centerleft government. They blame their alliance with the Independence Party in the previous government for their poor performance in the last election.	25X1
The Communist-dominated PA has participated in the government twice before, most recently from 1971-74. Because of its dependence on labor support, it has identified with high cost-of-living wage adjustments, which the	

PA believes labor wants in spite of the inflationary effect. The party, which has been uncooperative on economic reform, is expected to stop short of taking any step that

would lead to a break-up of the coalition because there is a good chance it would be left on the sidelines while its main competitor for the labor vote, the SDP, contin-

ued in government.

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Looking Ahead to Madrid: Soviet Views on European	
Security Consultations	25X1
There have been several indications that the Soviets are interested in expanding the discussion of military confidence-building measures (CBMs) in a forum associated with the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that will be held in Madrid in 1980. While it appears that Moscow's agenda for such discussions would be fairly unambitious, the Soviets seem anxious to contain incipient frustration in West European capitals over the lack of tangible progress in the Vienna force reduction talks and consequent sympathy for alternative arms control approaches, such as the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Soviet Criticism of CDE	
Soviet dissatisfaction with the French proposal re-	
surfaced during Franco-Soviet discussions in Moscow in mid-January. The senior French representative at the talks characterized the Soviet attitude as "very negative" but not a complete rejection.	25X1
The French propose a conference to which all the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act would be invited to negotiate a two-stage arms control program in a zone extending "from the Atlantic to the Urals." In the first stage, the French propose to focus on so-called military confidence-building measures, such as:	
An exchange of data on military forces, arma- ments, and deployments.	
Notification of military maneuvers and out-of- garrison activities.	

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covered by the CDE agreement.

-- Provisions for verification of military exercises

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-- Ceilings on the size and composition of forces engaged in certain maneuvers and exercises. The second stage of the French plan would be devoted to proportional reductions in major conventional air and ground force weapons systems by each of the participants within the proposed zone of reductions. 25X1 During the January talks, the Soviets, led by First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, objected to the proposed zone of application and to the exclusion from the agenda of nuclear weapons and naval forces. also noted that US and NATO equipment outside the zone would be exempt from limitations and that Soviet defense requirements were also affected by the Chinese threat. Moreover, the Soviets said that CBMs are already dealt with in CSCE, and the Central European balance is covered in mutual balance of force reduction (MBFR). 25X1 On previous occasions, Moscow had been less direct and explicit in its criticism of CDE. For example, during a visit to Paris in October, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was critical of CDE, but somewhat reluctantly agreed to exchange further opinions on the subject. 25X1 the same time, Gromyko urged French participation in MBFR and made reference to French association with the third round of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT III). [Soviet Interest in Confidence Building Measures Despite their criticisms, the Soviets may find the French interest in CBMs encouraging since they have themselves stressed the need to push for "military detente"

in Europe. CBMs have been a lingering subtheme of the European arms control dialogue since the Helsinki Conference in 1975 and, in a sense, they represent the residual military portion of the CSCE dialogue since it was decided to pursue other security issues in MBFR.

At the CSCE review conference in Belgrade, the Soviets proposed a CBM package that they called an "action program" on military detente. The Action Program was outlined by President Brezhnev in a speech on 21 October 1977. He proposed:

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- -- An all-European treaty on no first use of nuclear weapons.
- -- Nonexpansion of military alliances.
- -- Notification of major military exercises, the invitation of observers to some exercises, and a maneuver ceiling of 50,000 to 60,000 men.

Brezhnev concluded with the statement: "All these problems could soon be discussed in detail--parallel to the continuing Vienna negotiations--in special joint consultations by all participating parties of the European Security and Cooperation Conference."

The Question of a Forum

The Soviet action program was not adopted at Belgrade, but the Soviets have since kept alive in diplomatic channels the Brezhnev proposal for "special joint consultations" on security issues. Last May, at a meeting in Moscow with senior British officials, the Soviets asked for the British view of the idea that special consultations be held before the Madrid meeting on issues of military detente. The Soviet side declared that no one should be afraid of setting up yet another forum to discuss major issues of military detente not covered in other forums such as the Vienna negotiations.

This same appeal for "special consultations" has been subsequently made by Polish diplomats to representatives of several NATO countries, including West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and most recently the United States. Moreover, the Poles have claimed that they are making these appeals on behalf of the Warsaw Pact, pursuant to a decision reached at the Sofia Foreign Ministers conference in April 1978.

In their recent conversation with the United States, the Poles made several points:

-- They were strongly critical of the state of play in MBFR and the Western refusal to drop the data discussion and move on to other issues.

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- -- With explicit reference to the Soviet CBMs proposal at Belgrade, the Poles stated that, if it was not possible to expand the CBMs contained in the Helsinki Final Act, then a broader forum must be found for general security discussion.
- -- The Poles said that while the French CDE proposal contained a number of positive elements, timing and agenda were also important. Nuclear weapons reductions were the first priority and certain CBMs could be included in the broader forum proposed by the East.

MBFR: The Link?

Although the Poles were critical of the lack of progress in MBFR, they indicated that the Vienna negotiations were still the principal forum for the reduction of armaments in Europe. They implied that the West Germans were the cause of the slow pace of the talks and expressed concern that the United States seemed to be playing a less active role than before.

These Polish opinions probably reflect general Eastern sentiment on the course of MBFR. Last June, the East made what it considers to be a major concession to the West regarding the structure of NATO's own proposal for mutual force reductions. The East has made it clear that any further initiative on its part is dependent on a Western response to the June proposal. For its part, the West is insisting that the East first justify or explain the more than 150,000-man discrepancy between Eastern figures and NATO's estimate of Warsaw Pact ground forces in the zone of potential reductions.

With respect to the evolving security dialogue in Europe, the motives prompting the Eastern initiative are significant. As has been argued elsewhere,* it is possible that the Eastern initiative was motivated by a Soviet desire to lend substance to the positive political momentum in Soviet relations with Western Europe at a time when Soviet-US relations were stagnating.

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To a limited extent, the Eastern initiative has had the intended effect. Some NATO members have apparently become more willing than others to pursue discussion of other aspects of the East's proposal, in tandem with a continuing discussion on data. On the other hand, the Soviets are undoubtedly aware of the frustration of several NATO countries over the slow course of the MBFR talks, and Moscow probably interprets the limited West European interest in the French CDE proposal as an outgrowth of this frustration. (The Poles claim that the French have told them that all NATO allies except the United States support the CDE proposal. In fact, no other West European country has endorsed the CDE proposal and virtually all have reservations about the details of the plan.)

Suggestions of Western frustration, however, confront the Soviets and their allies with the problem of preserving the agenda and format of MBFR while deflecting sympathy for the French CDE proposal. Ideally, Moscow may hope that the French can be persuaded to join MBFR, particularly in light of Paris' more active participation in disarmament matters. At the same time, the Soviets may interpret the evident French interest in CBMs as a potential source of support for the Warsaw Pact proposal for "special joint consultations" on military detente.

The Madrid Agenda

On several recent occasions Soviet officials in Moscow have said that security questions should play an important role at the Madrid meeting. This same message was conveyed in a 28 January Pravda article that emphasized the prominence of disarmament problems in connection with the Madrid review conference.

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Given its dissatisfaction with the polemical exchanges at Belgrade, Moscow is anxious to work out the agenda for Madrid. This would have the advantage of limiting the consequences of a potential confrontation on human rights while conceivably resulting in agreed-upon measures in other areas that the Soviets can hold up as successful results of the CSCE process.

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An agreement on special security consultations with a CBM focus would be particularly advantageous to the Soviets. Politically, it would probably be perceived by Moscow as promoting the image of Soviet sincerity on European disarmament, while the costs of certain CBM measures might be judged acceptable from a military standpoint. It is likely, therefore, that Brezhnev's action program will be a recurring subject of Soviet attention in the months leading up to the Madrid meeting.

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